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ABSTRACT
  The following research presents a Cognitive Linguistic analysis of the construal and predi-
cation of Self-Awareness by way of the English reflexive construction employing two 
predicates ; find / lose oneself (hereafter SA event). The first analysis is from Cognitive Gram-
mar (CG). CG-inspired schematics allow construal components of SA events to be depicted 
economically. The second analysis, from Conceptual Metaphor theory, concludes with a 5-step 
logic that accurately explains how Self-Awareness comes to have the metaphorical meaning it 
does. The third analysis discusses the relationships between metaphor and metonymy.  
Within this discussion, SA events are found to be cases of both metonymy within metaphor as 
well as target-in-source construal, in that the reflexive pronoun displays a metonymic relation-
ship (specifically a WHOLE FOR PART) to the specific mental function of Self-Awareness. SA 
event predications as a whole, on the other hand, are expressed metaphorically by way of the 
cross-domain mapping of conceptual entailments of the verbs find and lose, and construe the 
conceptual metaphors [FINDING ONESELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF] and [LOSING ONE-
SELF IS LOSS OF AWARENESS OF SELF].
  Various individual components of SA events have been categorized in the literature in dif-
ferent ways, but analysis of SA events as whole, independent phenomena that motivate meta-
phoric construal is lacking. This discussion provides corpus data as well as theoretical 
arguments that support the delineation and categorization of the mental state of Self-Awareness 
as an independent conception that motivates the metaphorical construal of find and lose when 
occurring within the reflexive construction.
1. Introduction 
The following research presents a Cognitive Linguistic analysis of the construal and predication of 
Self-Awareness by way of the English reflexive construction employing two specific predicates ; find / 
lose oneself (hereafter SA event). The first analysis is from a Cognitive Grammar perspective (Ronald W 
Langacker, 1987, 1999 ; R.W. Langacker, 2006), the second is from Conceptual Metaphor theory (A. 
Lakoff & Becker, 1992 ; G. Lakoff, 1990b, 1993, 1996 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2008), and the third 
discusses the relationship between metaphor and metonymy. Within this discussion, it will be seen that 
SA events are cases of both metonymy within metaphor (Goossens, 2002) as well as target-in-source (Ruiz 
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de Mendoza & Díez, 2002) construal, in that the reflexive pronoun displays a metonymic relationship 
(specifically a WHOLE FOR PART) to the specific mental function of Self-Awareness. SA event predi-
cations as a whole, on the other hand, are expressed metaphorically by way of the cross-domain mapping 
of conceptual entailments of the verbs find and lose, and construe the conceptual metaphors [FINDING 
ONESELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF] and [LOSING ONESELF IS LOSS OF AWARENESS OF SELF]1, 
as in the following :
1. …Pelorate found himself looking down on white swirls with an occasional glimpse of pale blue 
or rusty brown… (Asimov, 2012, p. 68) 
2. She lost herself in the delicious daydream of being part of that group… 
	       (COCA : 1997.FIC.Bk.AfterNight)
These types of expressions have been categorized in the literature in different ways, but discussion of 
the Self-Awareness as an independent phenomenon that motivates the construals is lacking. This dis-
cussion provides corpus examples to support2 theoretical arguments that reinforces the need to delineate 
and categorize the mental state of Self-Awareness as an independent concept that is able to motivate the 
metaphorical construal of find and lose when occurring within the reflexive construction.
1.1. Self-Awareness defined
For the purpose of this linguistically oriented discussion, I will define Self-Awareness in the following 
way :
Self-Awareness is the cognitive function of conscious meta-perceptual awareness ; in other 
words, the mental state of conscious awareness of one’s physical, emotional and mental 
reaction(s) to interior and/or exterior perceptions.
It is critical here to distinguish between Self-Awareness and perception, although in folk3 use these may 
have a similar meaning. Perception, as it is used here, involves the direct, involuntary reactions to stim-
uli in/on the body and/or mind, i.e. the physical and/or emotional stimuli from an injury, or the physical/
emotional feeling(s) brought about by the tender words from a loved one, etc. Perceptions therefore, are 
basic, neurological reactions to mental/environmental stimuli. Self-Awareness, on the other hand, is the 
Awareness of these perceptions. It may be thought of as a type of meta-perception, i.e. the mind is aware of 
its own reactions to some physical or mental stimuli. This can be seen as occurring in three steps : 1) a 
stimulus is present (e.g., thorn prick on finger) 2) the mind perceives the stimulus (e.g., involuntarily 
 1 This discussion will follow the conventional cognitive semantic typography as conveyed by Feyaerts (Goossens, 
2002, p. 361). Small capitals (TREE) will be used for conceptual structures, italics (tree) for linguistic struc-
tures, and double quotes (“tree”) will be used for semantic structures.
 2 The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) and the British National Corpus (BNC) were con-
sulted in this research.
 3 The use of the word folk here is not meant in a derogatory sense, but to mean the non-specialist use of a word 
or phrase within a given society.
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pulls hand away) 3) an awareness of the perception of stimulus arises (e.g., thinking : 
“That hurts, now my finger is throbbing.”) This third step is the meaning of Self-Awareness used 
throughout this discussion.
2. Cognitive Grammar and SA 
This section will begin with a review of the literal expression The man found the cat according to 
Cognitive Grammar (CG) (Ronald W Langacker, 2002, Chapter 6) and then propose an original analysis 
for The man lost the cat based on that model. Similarities and differences will be analyzed and discussed. 
Following this, a discussion of reflexive expressions in CG reveals that reflexive expressions are treated 
as special cases of Subjectification in which the viewpoint of the conceptualizer, most commonly implicit, 
is included in the predication. Revision of the reflexive model will be necessary to represent the verbs 
find/lose as they occur metaphorically, especially with regard to the reflexive ‘Subjective’ elements con-
tained in the overall construal. 
2.1. Cognitive Grammar and find/lose
How is it that CG accounts for expressions using find and lose as they occur in language use?4 
Looking at (3), it can be seen that there are two nominals (‘things’, i.e., man and cat) and one verb (‘pro-
cessual relation’, i.e., find)5. 
3. The man found the cat.
According to CG, “The base of [FIND] includes a search process of indefinite duration. Only the final 
stages of that process are actually designated by the predicate and hence profiled…” (2002, p. 169). In 
other words, the process of [FIND] is continuous, but only the culmination of the process is given promi-
nence because [FIND] only occurs at the end of some searching process. However, counter-examples 
in which find does not include a ‘search process’ can also be construed and acceptably predicated. For 
example, a ‘base’ concept of ‘search process’ is untenable in (4a, c) and (5a, c)6 :
4a. (John lost his wallet last night. Jenny does not know John.) 
   Jenny found a wallet in the street. 
 b. (John knows Jenny and asked her to search for his lost wallet.) 
   Jenny found the wallet in the street.
 c. Jenny unintentionally/accidentally found a/the wallet.
 4 The original analysis in Langacker (2002) pertains to the Hopi language, but his methods and analysis support-
ing the theory are applicable to the proposal offered here.
 5 ‘Thing’ and ‘Relation’ are CG specific terms. See Langacker (2002, Chapter 6) for precise definitions. (In 
this example, the definite article will not be analyzed for ease of explanation.)
 6 In cases where minimal pairs are necessary to make a point, original examples are used.
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5a. (Harry went to the garden, but surprisingly, his wife was there.) 
   Harry found his wife sitting in the garden.
 b. (Harry was searching for his wife.) 
   Harry found his wife sitting in the garden.
 c. Harry unintentionally/accidentally found his wife in the garden.
The ‘search’ conception involved for [FIND] may or may not be present. In (4a, 5a), The wallet and wife 
simply appeared as visual stimuli, at which point they were found. The lack of a ‘search’ component in 
(4a, 5a) can be further supported by (4c, 5c), where modifying find with an adverb incompatible with 
‘search’ is unproblematic. 
Langacker’s analysis is accurate in that only the ‘culminating event’ is profiled for [FIND] (for both 
‘search’ and ‘non-search’ variations). For full predications in the CG framework, [FIND] interacts sche-
matically with its trajector (tr) (main focus of construal) and landmark (lm) (secondary focus of con-
strual). The composite scene is created out of the relationship between the more abstract schema 
levels to more concrete levels, as needed by the speaker and hearer to decode the intended mes-
sage. Langacker (2002, p. 173, Figure 7) provides a schematic for The man found the cat in which the 
‘search’ variant of [FIND] correlates with [CAT] and [MAN]. As proposed here, however, a new sche-
matic for ‘non-search’ [FIND] is also necessary, provided in Figure 1. Only two sub-events are neces-
sary for describing the (tr) and (lm) along the processual timeline (t). The first (left side of figure) where 
the man (tr) is not ‘aware’ of the cat (lm), i.e. THE MAN is ‘not searching’ for the CAT, and the second 
(right side of figure) where the man (tr) is ‘aware’ of the cat (lm), i.e. THE MAN ‘comes upon’ the 
CAT. The ellipse surrounding the man-cat now represents ‘Awareness’ (i.e., ‘non-search’ Awareness of 
perception). Therefore, with only slight adaptations to account for the ‘non-search alternation of [FIND], 
Figure 1. The man found the cat. (based on Ronald W Langacker, 2002, p. 173, Figure 7)
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the CG model accommodates a cognitive representation for both ‘search’ and ‘non-search’ construals 
quite economically.
A similar schema can be proposed for [LOSE], as in, The man lost the cat, represented in Figure 2. 
Here, the ‘search/aware’ ellipse in the final stage occurs only with the man (tr) due to the lack of percep-
tion of the cat (lm), i.e. [[LOSE]-[CAT]]. The (tr) is, however, conscious of that fact, i.e., he knows that 
he lost the cat. The dotted ellipse in the first time frame (left side) represents this knowledge, i.e., the 
man was aware of the cat at an earlier point in time, and recognizes this fact in the present, at which 
point the cat becomes lost. More generally for [LOSE], an lm cannot be [LOST] until the tr realizes that 
the lm is no longer in perceptual contact7. 
Taking these schematic representations of [FIND] and [LOSE] as a starting point, discussion of how 
reflexive predications are construed within this schematic representation are presented. 
2.1.1 CG and [FIND + x-self ]8
Are the schemata discussed above applicable to every case of [FIND] and [LOSE] where both the tr 
and lm are predicated? As expected, this is not the case. One difference emerges when the tr and lm 
refer to the same entity, i.e. the reflexive event. 
 7 Notice that this is a different conception from that of the lm knowing that it itself is lost. In one case, the more 
likely construal is that of tr occurring in an intransitive event (i.e., The cat is lost, i.e., it cannot find its way 
home.) In another case, the tr has intentionally run away, and is therefore not lost (from it’s own perspective).  
However, with regard to The man lost the cat from the perspective of the tr, these scenarios may be identical iff 
the tr believes that the cat has not intentionally run away.
 8 ‘x-self ’ refers generically to the English reflexive pronouns ; myself, yourself, etc. used specifically with reflex-
ive meaning, excluding intensifying, benefactive and logophoric meanings.
Figure 2. Schematic representation of The man lost the cat.
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6. Deliberately, he pinched himself on the thigh. 
       (COCA : 1996.FIC.FantasySciFi)
7. Did you see yourself in the mirror lately? 
       (COCA : 2011.FIC.IndianaCurrents)
8. But afterwards, I found myself in the dim bathroom... 
       (BNC : APC.W_misc)
How can these cases be schematically represented? In the simplest of schemata, a semi-circular line 
connects the tr and lm, showing the relation between the pronoun and antecedent. Another possibility 
is a connection that starts from the tr and returns upon itself, forming a circle (cf. Kemmer, 1993, p. 
71 ; R.W. Langacker, 2006, p. 368). These are useful for representing the basic reflexive situation in (6) 
and (7) ; however, this cannot account for the semantic complexity of the event in (8), even though they 
are predicated similarly. In particular, there is no reference to the main focus of the construal, i.e. Self-
Awareness of a specified perception/experience. The schematic arc line and circle account for simple 
reflexivity, but not for the metaphoricity and ‘Subjectivity’ (Ronald W Langacker, 1990) of SA events.
 ‘Subjectivity’ is a subtle phenomenon that describes a tripartite relationship between the speaker, 
hearer, and the conception being conveyed. It concerns the conceptual ‘stance’ of a predication, the 
mostly implicit ‘viewpoint’ from which the speaker codes meaning into a message and from which the 
hearer decodes that message. The conceptualizer creates meaning from a particular ‘stance’ that may 
totally exclude the conceptualizer, such as The boy walks the dog, or one that is greatly included in the 
conception, i.e., I thought I would walk the dog. There are various facets of these examples that could be 
described here, but the main concern for this discussion is ‘Point of View’ (POV), i.e., the level to which 
the conceptualizer and/or his vantage point is explicitly involved in the construal. 
According to Langacker, this ‘viewing relation’ or ‘Subjectification’ (Ronald W Langacker, 1985, 1990, 
2002) states that any first or second person account of an event constitutes some level of subjectification 
on the part of the referent. Van Hoek’s (1997) explanation of ‘subjective’ reflexivity is provided in full :
The referent of the reflexive…is viewed semisubjectively within the onstage region. That is, 
some participant in the scene views him/herself semisubjectively. The semisubjective percep-
tion of the referent is part of the agent’s experience, part of the conception being put onstage 
rather than just part of the speaker and addressee. This viewing relation is maintained 
throughout most of the extensions from the reflexive prototype (1997, p. 175).
The ‘extensions’ referred to in the last line of the quotation, in my opinion, relate to SA events as well.9 
One anecdote from the sport of golf might help clarify this. Proficient golfers have learned that 
when practicing, attention is paid to the mechanics of the swing : the stance, the rotation of the pelvis in 
relation to the spine and shoulder girdle, the angle of the arc of the swing, as well as the position of the 
ball, and numerous other factors. However, once involved in a game or tournament, the mechanical 
9 Van Hoek does not account for SA events specifically. Her arguments aim only to distinguish between ana-
phoric and reflexive pronouns and their respective environments.
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aspects fade into the background (if one is lucky), i.e., they become subconscious and automatic. The 
focus of attention is directed toward the targets (the fairway, green, and/or pin) and the object that needs 
to reach that target (the ball). Players ‘in the zone’ experience a total lack of SELF-reference and a 
complete goal-oriented mindset.10 This total ‘goal-oriented’ mindset can be equated with the ‘objective 
scene’ described in the The boy walks the dog. There is no explicit mention of the conceptualizer in the 
predication. It is an objective viewpoint — an ‘optimal viewing arrangement’ — where the conceptual-
izer remains ‘offstage’, as it were (Ronald W. Langacker, 1985 ; R.W. Langacker, 2006). On the other 
hand, I thought I would walk the dog represents a more subjective viewpoint, an ‘egocentric viewing 
arrangement’ (ibid.) in which the conceptualizer (and possibly the conception itself) is explicit and 
focused on, i.e. put ‘onstage’. 
Various levels or degrees are present between these extremes, Langacker claiming at least five 
(2008). Due to space constraints, however, only those which are directly relevant to SA construal and 
predication will be discussed here. Specifically, SA construal represents a non-displaced11 egocentric 
viewing relation in which the S (conceptualizer) is at maximum Subjectification. “The observer S is 
thus situated within the boundaries of this more extensive objective scene, reflecting the fact that S is no 
longer simply an observer, but also to some degree an object of observation. SELF-consciousness 
therefore attenuates the subjective/objective distinction” (Ronald W Langacker, 1985, p. 122). The fol-
lowing examples elucidate the difference between a simple Subjective schema and an SA schema, repre-
sented schematically in Figure 3.
9a. I was in the hospital. 
 b. I found myself in the hospital.12 
In Figure 3, the box labeled ‘H’ represents the conceptualizer placed inside a structure (e.g. Hospital). 
Since there is no processual element involved, no timeline appears below the schema. (9a) represents a 
viewing arrangement where the Ground (G) element (viewpoint of the conceptualizer S) is semi-
subjective ; SELF is part of the conception (i.e., first person subject pronoun). It is also included within 
the ‘scope of predication’ (represented by dotted lines), i.e., it is ‘onstage’. In general, this is the con-
ceptual basis for construal and predication of all first person predications.
In (9b), I found myself in the hospital represents a construal in which Awareness of the event (labeled 
S´) is ‘profiled’ by the conceptualizer (S). Because ‘Awareness’ (S´) is profiled, (even though both (S´) 
and (S) are put ‘onstage’), (S) loses its main profiled status (but keeps some hint of profile ; i.e., SELF is 
still part of ‘Awareness’). It remains linked to profiled (S´), predicated by way of the reflexive pronoun 
(construed metaphorically). In essence, the conceptualizer’s Awareness is put onstage as the profiled 
object of conceptualization, while the sub-event (I was in the hospital) no longer receives main profiling, 
10 It is also the concept and construal for the SA event lose x-self, discussed later in this research.
11 Displacement is described as an ‘alternate world’ in which the conceptualizer is present. This may be the 
form of a picture (see (Kuno, 1987 ; Panther et al., 2009, pp. 24-26)), theater performance, wax figure or some 
other form of ‘other-world’ scenario.
12 Original examples are used in order to keep minimal pairs as simple as possible.
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(although remaining within the scope of predication). A bold connecting line between S´ and G´ (ground 
for the Aware viewpoint) represents the 1st person conceptualizer as the one that finds the Ground. This 
relationship, in turn, relates to the sub-event (in a hospital), the solid arrow depicting this connection. 
The dotted arrow connecting the left and right components show that this is a processual relation, how-
ever momentary that process may be. [FIND], as a process, includes a time (t) element (outside the 
‘scope of predication’ — i.e., an implicit reference point). Only the end result of the process is profiled, 
as discussed above for general instances of [FIND]. 
There is another construal for the predication of [FIND + x-self] that appears in the both the COCA 
and BNC corpora and must be addressed. In these cases, it is not ‘awareness of perception’ that is con-
strued, but the ‘awareness of a transcendental or deeper SELF’, called the ‘true-Self metaphor’ (G. 
Lakoff, 1996)13. The difference between the two can be illustrated by (10) and (11) :
10. I was travelling for 6 months…when I found myself in India. (SA)
11. I was meditating for 6 months…when I found myself in India. (true-Self)
In (10), an SA event, the conceptualizer does not construe the SELF as a separate entity within the phys-
ical/mental confines of the first. The construal focuses on the Awareness of the conceptualizer’s percep-
tions/experiences. In (11), however, a separate identity (i.e., Subject, or Essence) is almost literally found 
within the confines of the physical/mental SELF (ibid.) The difference in construal can be schematically 
and economically depicted using CG representations. (10) is represented in Figure 3, while (11) is 
shown in Figure 4, representing “…a detached outlook in which the speaker treats his own participation 
as being on par with anybody else’s...” (Ronald W Langacker, 2002, p. 328). Thus, for the ‘true-Self 
13 0.5% of the ‘true Self’ metaphor occurred in random samples (n = 200 total, COCA and BNC), while SA events 
accounted for 98.5%.
Figure 3. CG model of the SA event : [FIND + x-self].
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metaphor’, all roles of Subjectivity and Objectivity 
are construed as maximally egocentric. The dual 
roles of Subject of Perception (S) and Object of Per-
ception (P) (i.e., SELF & SUBJECT as separate but 
interrelated entities) are represented as bold and 
grey circles which are onstage (OS), identified by 
the dotted square. The scene is processual (i.e., 
the verb FIND controls the scene), shown by the 
time line, but as with general cases of find, the pro-
file is only the end result of the process. The dot-
ted arc connecting the tr to the lm represents the 
reflexive event (Kemmer, 1993 ; Ronald W. Lan-
gacker, 1990). The stance from which the construal 
is conceived (S´) is connected to the onstage con-
strual by another dotted line, representing the scene 
as construed semi-subjectively from the offstage 
Ground (G), yielding the [[SELF] VIEWING [SUB-
JECT]] construal, a very different schema from that 
of Figure 3.
2.1.2 CG and [LOSE + x-self ]
The schema for the SA event [LOSE + x-self] 
presents an interesting challenge :
12. I lost myself in The Secret Garden, The Little Princess…. 
     (COCA : 1996.NEWS.USAToday)
In (12), the SA event [LOSE + x-self] includes the presupposition that at some previous moment in time, 
Self-Awareness was present. One cannot lose something one has never been aware of. Represented by 
the return arrow in the middle of Figure 5, past Awareness (the left portion of the diagram), although fall-
ing within the scope of predication, remains offstage (surrounded by dotted lines) for the conceptions of 
[SELF-AWARENESS] and [READ THE NOVELS], while only the relationship between the Conceptual-
izer (S´) and the Ground (G´) is profiled.
The final event (right portion of the diagram) of the timescale (bold, blunt-end line due to end-result 
profiling) represents the [LOSS OF SELF-AWARENESS] as the conceptualizer’s (S´) Awareness is 
totally absorbed in the novels (N) (but is not anymore14). The Ground (G´) is profiled (SELF-AWARE-
NESS is explicit) but is removed from the ‘scope of predication’ (small square dotted box), [SELF-
14 This is likely due to the nature of Awareness, i.e., that humans cannot be in the midst of [LOST AWARENESS] 
and simultaneously articulate that experience. To say, I have now lost awareness is an oxymoronic statement, 
for to be consciously articulating that mental state is to not be [LOST] in that state any longer. 
Figure 4.  CG-inspired schema for the construal of ‘true 
SELF metaphor’, I found myself (based on (R.W. 
Langacker, 2006, p. 369)).
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AWARENESS] now being totally Subjective in viewpoint (i.e., ‘offstage’) and “serving only as a point of 
reference for situating those entities that attract the focus of viewing attention” (Ronald W Langacker, 
1985, p. 124) ; it is lost, after all.
Because of the 1st person vantage point, however, the coreferential conceptualizer (S-S´) still main-
tains the profiling and onstage status. The conceptualizer construes an event that is no longer in prog-
ress, represented by the profiled blunt-end timeline, the left dot in the timeline representing the onset of 
the loss of Self-Awareness and the right dot representing the time of predication of the event, which is 
end-result oriented. Similar to Figure 3, a profiled bold connecting line between S´ and G´ represents 
the 1st person conceptualizer as the one who has lost the Ground. This relationship, in turn, refers to 
the sub-event being construed (i.e., reading the romance novels), a solid arrow depicting this conception. 
Although CG schemata represent SA predications accurately, their descriptions can get cumber-
some, especially when dealing with multi-level metaphors, [[FIND/LOSE] + x-self] included. For SA 
events, this complexity is due to the abstract nature of the nominals plus the absence of a predicated 
focus (i.e., FIND x-self =Awareness) as well as the conceptual presuppositions of certain verbs (i.e. 
[LOSE]).
2.2. The Divided Self  and SA events
Another type of analysis proposes a distinct, semi-independent psyche, a phenomenon often called 
the ‘divided self’, where one part of the mind is ‘at odds’ with another part. This occurs especially for 
the reflexive causative construal, e.g., I made myself go to the gym. 
Much research has been conducted on causative expressions since Talmy began to apply the notions 
of Force Dynamics onto linguistic construal (Talmy, 2001, 2003). The main tenets of this theory are : 1) 
objects (Agonists) can apply, block or remove physical and/or psychological force to/from other objects 2) 
objects (Antagonists) can have physical and/or psychological force applied or freed (blockage removed), 3) 
exertion of these forces is not binary but exist on a cline, and 4) the way we view the effects of force in a 
Figure 5. CG-inspired schema for : SA : [[lose x-self] in (novels)].
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particular situation is the way it is construed and predicated (Gilquin, 2010 ; Talmy, 2001, 2003). Appli-
cations of force dynamic principles to various types of linguistic construal and predication are ubiquitous ; 
“… the force-dynamic system in language is not limited to a small inventory of simplex patterns but has 
the property of open-ended generativity” (Talmy, 2001, p. 435) Force dynamics is proposed as the base or 
image schema for various causative constructions. 
Due to space constraints, an in-depth analysis of causation will not be discussed here ; however, one 
specific point directly related to SA events will be presented. This is a subcategory of force dynamics 
called ‘Psychodynamics’ (Talmy, 2001) where a psychological force is exerted upon one or both of the 
participants in a construal. Within ‘psychodynamics’ is the specific case of reflexive constructions, 
called ‘coreferential causative constructions’ (Gilquin, 2010). For example,
13. He held himself back from responding.
14. He exerted himself in pressing against the jammed door. (Talmy, 2001, p. 432)
The ‘psychodynamic’ situations in (13) and (14) are intriguing. If force is applied from one object to 
another, what and how is this force manipulated during a reflexive event? It has been proposed that one 
part of the Self (a peripheral part) acts upon another part of the Self (a central part)15, in the phenomenon 
called ‘the divided self’ or similar phrases (A. Lakoff & Becker, 1992 ; G. Lakoff, 1996 ; G. Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999 ; Ronald W Langacker, 1990 ; Talmy, 2003). The fundamental concept behind this phe-
nomenon is a two-tier system comprised of the following (depending on one’s terminology) : Ego, Id, 
Subject, Super-ego and Self (Gilquin, 2010 ; Talmy, 2001), one of these being the ‘core’ or ‘center’ of 
consciousness and the other the ‘mundane’ or ‘peripheral’ action-based mind. In some cases, one part 
of the Self exerts force upon the physical body ; in other cases, the Self exerts control over another part 
of the psyche. Different levels and types of force can be exerted, and these guide the choice of construal 
and predication. Gilquin (2010) discusses the ‘divided self’ based on Talmy, and includes much detail as 
well as corpus evidence supporting her arguments. Being specifically a study of causation limits its 
applicability to SA event construal, however. The concepts construed for [FIND/LOSE + x-self] are 
very different from causative physical or psychological processes.
15. Well, he looked and he looked until he found himself.
        (COCA : 1996.SPOK.ABC_Brinkley)
In (15), a part (‘peripheral’) of the SELF searches for another part (‘central’), and subsequently finds this 
part of the psyche that was perhaps psychologically hidden or underdeveloped. This construal ade-
quately corroborates the ‘divided self’ phenomenon (without explicit causation). The construal can be 
represented as maximally egocentric, i.e., the Subject views the Self in the same way he would an inde-
15 Talmy uses the terms ‘peripheral’ and ‘central’ and to refer to general patterns of Agonistic/Antagonistic forces, 
respectively. The basic state of the ‘central’ part is ‘repose’ or inaction, while the ‘peripheral’ part ‘exerts’ the 
force. Many expressions contain construals that lend themselves to this kind of analysis, but it is proposed 
here that SA is not one of them.
24─      ─
八戸学院大学紀要　第 51号
pendent Object. However, (16) exemplifies a different construal :
16. …he was fond of people in whose company he found himself… 
        (COCA : 1995.ACAD.AmerScholar)
In (16), although ‘divided SELVES’ seem to be predicated, the construal is a single entity, i.e. SELF-
AWARENESS of a certain perception/experience (being fond of people he was with). There may be a minor, 
fleeting recognition of the ‘divided self’, but this must be subsequently denied in order to accurately com-
prehend the construal. It is along this parameter that the differences in meaning between (15) and (16) 
can be delineated. 
Lakoff and Johnson (1999) examine the ‘divided self’ by way of the folk theory of ‘Essence’, whereby 
“…each person is seen as having an Essence that is part of the Subject (‘center’). The person may have 
more than one Self, but only one of those Selves is compatible with that Essence. This is called the 
“real” or “true” Self” (p. 242, my parenthesis). This explanation begins to untangle the metaphorical 
aspects of expressions in (15) and (16) but also in examples (17-19). The ‘divided-self’ is an insightful 
proposal that covers a vast number of metaphorical instances :
17. And then when someone tells you the answer you kick yourself. 
        (BNC : G1W.W_fict_prose)
18. She gave herself time to regain her self-control… 
        (BNC : GW3.W_fict_prose)
19. But although I asked myself the question, I knew the answer. 
        (BNC : H8G.W_fict_prose)
According to the ‘divided Self’ analysis, the Subject is the deeper, ‘central’ part of the Self, and the Self is 
the ‘peripheral’, actively changing aspect of the Self. In (17-19), kick, gave, and ask are metaphorically 
construed and occur within the [reflexive x-self] construction. The events’ total construal is contained 
therein, with no conceptual ‘bleeding’ into other parts of the predication. In other words, [non-SA verbs 
+ reflexive x-self] are self-contained construals : kick, gave, and asked are not dependent on the follow-
ing (or preceding) components for their meaning to be construed (except for general metaphoricity). In 
(17), one can kick oneself due to a variety of reasons and the metaphoric content does not change. In (18) 
one can give oneself an assortment of things in a range of situations and the metaphorical content of give 
remains unchanged. Similarly in (19), the metaphorical construal of asking oneself does not change 
according to the surrounding details. In all of these examples, the ‘divided-self ’ phenomenon is 
construed ; they are self-contained construals comprised of [Subject - Self].
SA events such as (20) and (21), on the other hand, complicate matters :
 
20. …many parents find themselves facing a bureaucracy they don’t understand… 
        (COCA : 2005.MAG.TodaysParent)
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21. As he drives, the older girl loses herself in thoughts of boys... 
        (COCA : 2000.FIC.VirginiaQRev)
One complexity concerns the construal of the overall metaphor. In (17-19), the construals are congru-
ent with the meanings of the predicates and pre- or post-x-self adjuncts do not affect the internal dynam-
ics of the metaphors. However, the SA events in (20) and (21) expose the ‘divided-self’ explanation as 
incongruous. The ‘divided self ’ and ‘true Self ’ do not account for the idiosyncratic meaning of SA 
events.16 In SA events, the predicate is dependent on the post x-self adjunct (or pre-reflexive predica-
tions, in the case of fronted relative clauses) for its construal. Without its adjunct, in fact, the ‘true Self’ 
is the only metaphor recoverable. In (20), for example, facing a bureaucracy is the object of experiential 
Awareness, and is an obligatory part of the construal. It is specifically this facing a bureaucracy that the 
parents are aware of, without which, there is no object of Awareness, which is easily misconstrued for the 
‘true Self ’ metaphor, i.e., The parents found themselves. Similarly with (21), removing the object of 
awareness, thoughts of boys, SA events are misconstrued as ‘true Self’ metaphors (e.g., the older girl loses 
herself). The adjuncts are a vital part of the total conception and distinguish them as SA. One cannot 
simple find oneself, one must find oneself + some situation or undergoing some experience. Similarly one 
must lose oneself + a perception or experience in order for SA to be construed properly.
Self-Awareness is comprised of three sub-parts : 1) a stimulus, 2) perception of the stimulus, and 3) 
Awareness of the perception. They are bound together in one construal called Self-Awareness. Look-
ing again at (20), facing a bureaucracy is the obligatory object of Awareness, not the SELF or SUB-
JECT. Attributing conceptual focus to either the SELF and/or SUBJECT leads again to a different and 
inaccurate construal. In other words, the primary meaning of the metaphor is the Awareness of some 
perception/experience, not the conception of two selves divided, although there is no denying its lesser 
role in the metaphor.
Thus, although the ‘divided-self’ phenomenon helps clarify many metaphorical reflexive events, SA 
events do not fall within its purview. Specifics of how SA events come to have the metaphorical mean-
ings they do with the predications provided is the next point of discussion. How concepts are con-
nected, i.e., ‘mapped’, is summarized with respect to two types of mapping, metaphoric and metonymic.
2.3. Conceptual metaphor
Clarification of the use of the term metaphor is a first necessary step towards proper analysis of SA 
events in relation to conceptual metaphor. The term metaphor, as it is used here, is not what is com-
monly known as ‘literary’ metaphor, often used in poetry, literature, art and drama. This is the purpose-
ful, often idiosyncratic use of figurative language for dramatic and imagistic purposes. The term 
metaphor utilized here is often called conceptual metaphor (when referring to the underlying patterns of 
thought), or linguistic metaphor (when referring to the expression itself) (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 2008, p. 
7). This type of metaphor occurs in natural language use. Its use is mainly unconscious, conceptual 
and grounded in human experience and culture (Deignan, 2005 ; Kovecses, 2002 ; G. Lakoff, 1990b, 
16 Not to imply that they were meant to.
26─      ─
八戸学院大学紀要　第 51号
1993 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2008 ; Panther et al., 2009 ; Yu, 2008). It has been proposed that the 
way we experience the world (both physically and mentally) as well as our culture affects the way we 
think and use language (Deignan, 2005 ; Gibbs Jr. & Steen, 1999). 
The distinction between literary and conceptual metaphor is not as cleat-cut as described above, 
however. The literary metaphors in the passage by Dante below are literary, but are also instances of 
conceptual metaphor, specifically, LIFE IS A JOURNEY17 and KNOWING IS SEEING (Deignan, 2005, 
2008 ; G. Lakoff, 1993 ; Yu, 2008).
22. In the middle of life’s road
   I found myself in a dark wood.     
 (Dante Alighieri, “The Inferno”, lines 1-3. In G. Lakoff, 1993, p. 237)
Lakoff (1993) explains that “I found myself in a dark wood evokes the knowledge that if it’s dark you can-
not see which way to go. This evokes the image of SEEING and the conceptual metaphor KNOWING 
IS SEEING…The experiential basis in this case is the fact that most of what we know comes through 
vision, and in the overwhelming majority of cases, if we see something, then we know it is true” (p. 
240). Although the KNOWING IS SEEING conceptual metaphor, as related to the first and second lines 
of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, is warranted for the predication dark wood, in this particular case 
there is an additional analysis for line two that is just as pertinent to the intended meaning. The use of I 
found myself is a key component of the total construal here, if the translator’s note (Alighieri, 2008) with 
regard to dark wood is taken into consideration : Dante’s world was socially and politically controlled by 
the Church. ‘Passions, vices and perplexities’ were considered evil. (The conceptual metaphor DARK 
IS EVIL is also appropriate here). If SELF-AWARENESS is proposed as the meaning for ‘I found 
myself…’ in the second line, with the interpretation of I was suddenly aware (that I was surrounded by 
evil), it would certainly convey Dante’s well-known contempt for the unethical political situation of 
Church politics surrounding him at that time (Alighieri, 2008). This line of reasoning is further sup-
ported by lines 10-12 :
23. I cannot well repeat how there I entered,
   So full was I of slumber at the moment
   In which I abandoned the true way. (ibid., p. 1)
Dante writes metaphorically that he cannot say (i.e., he doesn’t know) how he got to that place (dark wood) 
because he was metaphorically ‘so full of slumber at the moment’ (i.e. unaware). Furthermore, the true 
way in line three most certainly refers to the Catholic righteous path of moral and ethical behav-
ior. Thus, the construal conveys Dante’s sudden awareness of the unethical state of affairs surrounding 
him. He chooses the expression I found myself within a dark wood, to imply that he was previously 
unaware of this situation, but has now become aware of it. Furthermore, he is now fully aware of this situ-
17 The conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY in relation to Dante’s Inferno will not be discussed here due to 
space constraints, but the analysis by Lakoff seems warranted. 
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ation and he wants the reader(s) to know this. In contrast, if he had chosen the sentence I was in a dark 
wood, the character might or might not have been aware of his own situation (even though the narrator is 
sure to be). The specific expression I found myself in a dark wood not only enriches the psyche of the 
character (he has knowledge of his own Point of View), but also helps deflect social responsibility away 
from the narrator/writer for possible heretical ideas against the Church that the character (and narrator) 
may have held. Thus, the construal of the Self-Aware conceptual metaphor [FINDING ONESELF IS 
AWARENESS OF SELF] in the first stanza is vital to the deeper interpretation of the poem as a 
whole. In sum, literary metaphors are often used as tools for specific imagistic purposes, but conceptual 
metaphors are also used throughout literature (Gibbs, 1994 ; Kövecses, 2010 ; G. Lakoff & Turner, 
2009).
What exactly is a metaphor? There are many variations and levels of specificity regarding a defini-
tion of metaphor. “A metaphor is a word or expression that is used to talk about an entity or quality 
other than that referred to by its core, or most basic meaning. This non-core use expresses a perceived 
relationship with the core meaning of the word, and in many cases between two semantic fields” 
(Deignan, 2005, p. 34). This definition is accurate in that it captures the general functions and struc-
tures of metaphor, i.e., its non-core use, along with the establishment of a relationship between the mean-
ings of a word along with the concept of semantic field. However, how does one define and delineate 
what is core and basic what is not? If these are based on prototypes, how exactly are these prototypes 
delineated? What is a semantic field and what is its composition? This definition lacks the specificity 
needed to analyze the precise components of metaphorical expressions, including SA events. Cameron 
(2008) provides a more precise definition. “Linguistic metaphor is identified through the use of words 
or phrases that are potentially linked to a vehicle (or source) domain which is distinct from the domain of 
the surrounding, ongoing talk (a topic or target)” (p. 198). The term linking of domains is found (in one 
form or another) in other cognitive linguistic definitions of metaphor as well (Bartsch, 2002 ; ibid. ; 
Deignan, 2008 ; Dirven, 2002 ; Gibbs Jr, 2008 ; e.g., Kovecses, 2002 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2008 ; 
G. Lakoff & Turner, 2009 ; Warren, 2002). However, due to the subtleness of SA events, and in order to 
avoid as much ambiguity as possible, an even more specific definition of metaphor is necessary. There-
fore, the definition by Barcelona (2002), utilized in this discussion, is presented in full :
Metaphor is the cognitive mechanism whereby one experiential domain…is partially mapped 
onto a different experiential domain, the second domain being partially understood in terms of 
the first one. The domain that is mapped is called the source or donor domain, and the domain 
onto which it is mapped, is called the target or recipient domain. Both domains have to belong 
to different superordinate domains. (Barcelona, 2002, p. 211)
The specificity of Barcelona’s definition is useful, but questions remain : What is a mapping and why is 
the mapping only partial? What is a superordinate domain and why do the domains need to be separate? 
By investigating these specific concerns, SA events can be accurately analyzed from the stance of con-
ceptual metaphor. 
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2.4. Mapping of  Metaphor
In cognitive linguistics, the term mapping is used to describe the specific relationship between two 
or more concepts. Regarding metaphoric expressions, it describes a concept from one domain being 
related to a concept of another domain18 (Barcelona, 2000, 2002 ; Croft, 2002 ; Kovecses, 2002 ; Kövec-
ses, Palmer, & Dirven, 2003 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 2008 ; Panther & Thornburg, 2002). These 
domains may be basic or abstract, but the mapping usually proceeds in only one direction, from the con-
crete to the abstract category19 (Grady & Johnson, in Dirven & Pörings, 2002, p. 539 ; Littlemore, 2015). 
The term source (or topic) is used for a concept’s foundational domain, i.e. the domain from which the 
concept is taken. The term target (or vehicle) is used for a domain whose concept is used in the predica-
tion. For example, Sally is an angel means that Sally has angel-like qualities. The speaker intends to 
convey that the qualities displayed by Sally such as compassion, joy, generosity, tenderness, etc., (i.e., 
source domain concepts), are mapped onto those conceived qualities usually (deemed by particular individ-
uals or cultures) displayed by angels (target domain concepts). The mapping is only partial because there 
are many qualities that angels have besides those chosen ; for example, they have wings, halos, they are 
able to fly, they are messengers from God, etc. In our understanding of the metaphor above, we do not 
map wings, halos, etc. onto Sally. Sally has a limited number of traits from the source domain,20 but not 
all of them, because if the mapping were absolute, the concepts would be identical and thus be individu-
ally unrecognizable.
Looking at specific cases of conceptual mapping for SA events, the first, KNOWING IS SEEING (G. 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), represents a very well-known metaphor. This is instantiated by :
24. I see what you mean. (COCA : 2011.SPOK.CNN.Behar)21
With regard to SA events, one cannot FIND what one does not SEE, a natural extension of (24) being the 
metaphor FINDING IS KNOWING, and can be instantiated by numerous examples such as :
25. So many people find it very very difficult… 
        (BNC : G3V.S_classroom)
26. …Students found this exercise helpful… 
        (COCA : 2009.ACAD.CommCollegeR)
Furthermore, and very naturally, if FINDING IS KNOWING then LOSING IS HAVING KNOWN, which 
is also construed and predicated :
18 Although there are many terms for and subtle differences in the definition of ‘domain’, in general terms, it can 
be described as a group of interrelated concepts that form a loose conceptual network from which meaning is 
construed.
19 As opposed to metonymy, which “are in general reversible” (Barcelona, 2000 ; G. Lakoff, 1990a).
20 See Lakoff for further details of metaphorical mapping especially with regards to conceptual constraints, i.e., 
the ‘Invariance Hypothesis’ (G. Lakoff, 1990a ; Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002)
21 In the COCA and BNC corpus combined, n = 190.
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27. Your generation has lost touch with solitude… 
        (COCA : 2012.FIC.MassachRev)
28. …the Government has lost sight of their stated aims... 
        (BNC : K5D.W_news_other_report)
29. …especially Charlotte lost patience with him. 
        (BNC : KGP.S_unclassified)
Using the words FIND to mean KNOW and LOSE to mean HAVING KNOWN are proposed to be the 
base conceptual metaphors for SA events. 
30. One night, I found myself at a party with Naomi Campbell… 
        (COCA : 2012.SPOK.ABC_20/20)
31. I lost myself in thoughts of meeting kind people… 
         (COCA : 2008.FIC.Triquarterly)
In (30), a particular SELF-KNOWLEDGE (i.e. Awareness of being at a party) is being conveyed by I 
found myself, while in (31) a particular SELF-KNOWLEDGE that was present but is no longer is conveyed 
by I lost myself (i.e. non-Awareness of anything except the conceptual focus, i.e., thoughts of meeting 
kind people). 
What specific kinds of KNOWLEDGE do SA events refer to? Two conceptual metaphors are 
needed to complete the logic of SELF-AWARENESS for SA events. One is THE MIND IS A CON-
TAINER FOR OBJECTS (G. Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) and the other is MENTAL STATES ARE 
OBJECTS (Yu, 2008). When we think of the mind, we imagine it as a container that holds things like 
ideas, dreams, hallucinations, theories, etc. We imagine putting things in the mind as well as taking 
things out of the mind. For example, in (32) and (33) :
32. I had other people in mind as well actually. 
        (BNC : FM2.S_meeting)
33. That’s one of those things I think I blanked out of my mind. 
        (COCA : 2012 : SPOK.ABC_20/20)
34. His mental state has been very stable… 
        (BNC : CBF.W_newsp_other_report)
35. …there are no fresh ideas on how to do it. 
        (COCA : 2012 : SPOK.CBS_NewsEve)
The mind can also be in different states, and each of these can be thought of as some kind of object. 
For example, Emotions can be light or heavy, Ideas can be stale or fresh, etc. Examples (34) and (35) 
show instances of the MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS conceptual metaphor.
In order for SA events to be able to convey SELF-AWARENESS, the above three metaphors need 
to work in collaboration : FINDING IS KNOWING, THE MIND IS A CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS, and 
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MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS. SA event metaphors can now be proposed as : FINDING ONE-
SELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF and LOSING ONESELF IS LOSS OF AWARENESS OF SELF. The 
following steps in logic are needed for the SA event metaphor to function :
1. THE MIND IS A CONTAINER FOR OBJECTS
2. MENTAL STATES ARE OBJECTS
3. OBJECTS CAN BE FOUND OR LOST
4. SELF-AWARENESS IS A MENTAL STATE
5. Therefore, SELF-AWARENESS IS AN OBJECT THAT CAN BE FOUND OR LOST
This is not to say that every time an SA event occurs, the interlocutors consciously go through all five 
logical steps in order. What is proposed here is that encased (i.e., entailed) within the SA event con-
strual is the subconscious logic of FIND/LOSE ONSELF as stated above ; it is immanent to the under-
standing of the metaphor. 
2.5. Mapping of  Metonymy
 There is another type of mapping that plays a role in SA events. This is a mapping that happens 
within the same domain (i.e., related ideas network) and is called metonymy (Croft, 1993 ; Goossens, 
2002 ; G. Lakoff & Johnson, 2008 ; Ronald W Langacker, 1987 ; Littlemore, 2015). It has often been 
cited as being referential in nature and therefore many definitions of metonymy include this referential 
aspect (Ronald W Langacker, 2009b). However, as Ruiz de Mendoza and Velasco (2002) point out, there 
are metonymies that are not strictly referential ; for example, Mary is just another pretty face, where pretty 
face does not directly refer to any one person’s pretty face, but beauty in general. They claim that due 
to this type of construal, referentiality should be excluded from a general definition of metonymy. They 
propose an alternate explanation based on domain inclusion/exclusion, metonymy being the former and 
metaphor the latter. This is similar to Goossens’ definition, “ …the crucial difference between meton-
ymy (and synecdoche) and metaphor is that in a metaphoric mapping two discrete domains are involved 
whereas in the metonymy, the mapping occurs within a single domain” (2002, p. 351). This definition is 
also concordant with others (Barcelona, 2000 ; Kovecses, 2006 ; Littlemore, 2015), and one which will 
be used in this discussion. 
Mendoza and Velasco (2002) further characterize metonymy based on whether a specific character-
istic of the concept is being highlighted within the domain (called source-in-target) or whether the domain 
as a whole (called domain matrix) is being used to stand for a particular member of that domain (called 
target-in-source). Langacker (2009b) calls this highlighting function activation zone, as well as tradition-
ally labeled WHOLE FOR PART and PART FOR WHOLE (Feyaerts, 2000 ; Kovecses, 2002 ; G. Lakoff, 
1990a, 1993 ; Littlemore, 2015).
36. The ham sandwich wants his check. 
        (Gibbs Jr, 2008, p. 22)
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37. Lefty is on the right track. Phil Mickelson hit a bit of a lull… 
        (COCA : 2012.NEWS.Houston)
The underlined parts of (36) and (37) show metonymic construal of the PART FOR WHOLE (i.e., synec-
doche) and WHOLE FOR PART types, respectively. In (36), The ham sandwich corresponds to a PART 
of the person as a WHOLE, specifically, the part that ordered the ham sandwich corresponding to the 
entire person. In (37), Lefty corresponds to a WHOLE group of people that display left-hand orientation 
and corresponds to a specific person (PART) who becomes an archetype. 
The WHOLE FOR PART (i.e., ‘target-in-source’) metonymy is applicable to SA events. Here, the 
WHOLE person (predicated by the reflexive pronoun myself, ourselves, etc…) stands for a single PART of 
the person (the Mental State of Self-Awareness).
38. The plane began to fall. Barry found himself stepping on the gas.
        (COCA 1998, FIC. Bk : WasItSomething)
39. After 14 months of unemployment, he found himself lying drunk on the floor of a room… 
        (COCA 1999. NEWS, Atlanta)
40. …she basks in the sun and loses herself in reading about the mythic lives of the gods and god-
desses. (COCA 1997. FIC, BK : PassionDreamBook)
41. …meant setting aside their identity in the outside world and (visitors to the Gallery) losing 
themselves in the art on the walls… (COCA 2003. ACAD, ArtBulletin)
In (38-41), and all SA events, the reflexive pronoun does not refer to the whole person as with literal or 
other types of metaphorical instances such as (42) and (43) :
42. Bernard Goldberg published a book titled 100 People Who Are Screwing Up America and I 
found myself listed as culprit number 80. 
       (COCA 2011. ACAD, AmerScholar)
43. Father, I fear I have badly lost myself in the woods. 
       (COCA 2005. FIC, FantasySciFi)
The reflexive pronoun of SA events does not simply refer back to the antecedent in a one-to-one rela-
tionship, irrespective of its predication. If this were the case, we could not understand the metaphorical 
meaning of SA events as Self-Awareness. For SA events, the construal of the predicate as a whole, i.e., 
the contextual, online knowledge of the construal, dictates the referent of reflexive pronoun. In (38) and 
(39), what is found is not the physical person, not the gestalt psychological person, not the ‘true Self’ or 
similar entity. What is found is Self-Awareness of a particular perception/experience.
If the pronoun-antecedent relationship in SA events is not a one-to-one correspondence but relies 
on contextual knowledge to be understood, then a new way of looking at the phenomenon of metonymy 
emerges.
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In recent years there has been something of a move towards more flexible, context-based 
approaches to metonymy. Rather than viewing metonymy simply as a ‘domain transfer’ or 
‘domain highlighting’ process, there has also been much more of a focus on the role of context 
in metonymy interpretation and production ; individual metonymies cannot be seen as indepen-
dent of what came before them and what will come after them in both the sentence and the text, 
and even in life more generally (Littlemore, 2015, p. 59).
A context-based approach is necessary for the delineation of SA events ; both metaphor and metonymy 
are present within one predication. Because of this complexity, two theories are presented as particu-
larly relevant to SA events. The first is called ‘metonymy within metaphor’ (Goossens, 2002). The sec-
ond is the distinction between ‘target-in-source’ and ‘source-in-target’ (Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002). 
SA events are instances of what Goossens (2002) describes as metonymy within metaphor, which are 
cases in which metaphorical expressions include a ‘built-in metonymy’. Goosens uses the example 
Shoot one’s mouth off. Quoting in full :
The donor domain is the foolish or uncontrolled use of firearms : the foolish (and therefore 
potentially, though not intentionally, dangerous) use of a gun is mapped onto unthoughtful lin-
guistic action. By integrating mouth into a scene relating to the use of firearms it is reinter-
preted as having properties of a gun in the donor domain ; this is the metaphorisation in the 
donor domain. In the recipient domain, however, there is a first level of interpretation which 
amounts to something like “using one’s mouth foolishly,” in which mouth is a metonymy for 
speech faculty. Again the significance of the metonymy becomes clear, if one replaces mouth by 
parts of the body which are less or not functional in the act of speaking (such as nose or eyes) 
(Goossens, 2002, p. 364).
For SA, this ‘built-in’ metonymy is the tethering of the reflexive pronoun to the mental state of Self-
Awareness. Without this basic-level metonymy, the metaphor as a whole cannot function. In fact, dis-
regarding this metonymy (i.e., using the reflexive pronoun to mean something else) nullifies the intended 
conception. For example, if the reflexive pronoun is mapped onto the domain of Essence (from Lakoff, 
above), then the ‘true-Self’ metaphor emerges. If the reflexive pronoun is mapped onto some other 
concept, one’s picture in the paper, for example, then the ‘Awareness Condition on picture noun phrases’ 
(Kuno, 1987) phenomenon is construed.
‘Target-in-source’ metonymies include a domain reduction due to the highlighted feature (a type of 
conceptual narrowing) of the domain being central to the conception (Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002). 
SA events display these properties, myself standing for Self-Awareness (a part of one’s total self), as 
shown in Figure 6. In the target domain there is a first level interpretation of Self-Awareness in which 
the reflexive x-self is a metonym for the specific Mental State of Self-Awareness, and this drives the meta-
phor as a whole. In the source domain, the metaphor a person finding an object is mapped (cross-domain) 
on to a person aware of self. By integrating the metonymic reflexive x-self with finding an object, we get 
the metaphorical reading, FINDING THE SELF IS AWARENESS OF SELF. Without applying this met-
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onymic step, there is no target ‘anchor’ upon which the whole predication is to be based. Again, if the 
target domain is left empty or underspecified, then the gestalt x-self assumes meaning, resulting in the 
‘true-SELF’ metaphor described previously. This is, I believe, the exact point of ambiguity when poly-
semous predications appear, as in (44a, b) :
 
44. A year after the war began, I found myself in Madrid…
        (COCA : 2012.FIC.Analog)
   a. SA event : I was aware that I was in Madrid. 
   b. ‘true-SELF’ metaphor : I realized my true Self in Madrid.
The context is needed to derive the correct construal, providing the interlocutor with necessary 
conceptual information. Does x-self hold a metonymic relation to the Mental State of Self-Awareness 
(i.e., SA event), or are other Subjects and Selves construed? The context will advise the interlocutors 
on which is the most appropriate conception for the situation.
In sum, metonymy-within-metaphor as well as target-in-source metonymic analyses shed light on the 
delineation of SA events. SA events construe and predicate a metonymic sub-event, X-SELF STANDS 
FOR MENTAL STATE OF SELF-AWARENESS, encased within a larger metaphorical event, FINDING 
ONESELF IS SELF-AWARENESS and LOSING ONESELF IS LOSS OF SELF-AWARENESS. 
3. Conclusions and Discussion
This research presented three Cognitive Linguistic views of metaphorical English reflexive expres-
sions in the form of find/lose x-self that construe Self-Awareness. SA events were explained by way of 
Cognitive Grammar, Conceptual Metaphor theory, and metonymy within metaphor as well as target-in-
source construal. SA events are represented by the conceptual metaphors [FINDING ONESELF IS 
SELF-AWARENESS] and [LOSING ONESELF IS LOSS OF SELF-AWARENESS]. Corpus examples 
from both the COCA and the BNC were used throughout the discussion.
Further research questions remain, however. Specifically, there are pragmatic factors (such as sen-
Figure 6. Mapping of SA according to “target-in-source” metonymy (based Ruiz de Mendoza and Velasco (2002))
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tential stress and intonation) that also seem to play a role in construal choice when polysemous predica-
tions do occur. Native and non-native speaker tests for these may reveal other processing functions 
necessary for metaphor creation and comprehension. 
Another interesting line of inquiry is the relationship between the neuronal processes of self-aware-
ness related to SA events. Others (Coulson, 2008 ; Feldman, 2008 ; G. Lakoff, 2008) have already 
begun this research for metaphor in general, and I believe it only a matter of time before specific research 
on the precise relationship between self-awareness and metaphor debuts. Self-awareness provides us 
the ability to examine not only our physical perceptions and experiences, but also our mental and emo-
tional perceptions and experiences. Self-awareness is thus the first step in understanding, and any sub-
sequent premeditated action (physical, mental, linguistic, etc.) must have its roots in this. It is my 
sincere hope that one day soon these relationships will be explored and understood in more depth.
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